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LANDLORD AND TENANT-UNLAWFUL DETAINER-STORAGE AND
SALE OF EvIcTED TEANT's PROPERTY-ExEmPTION STATUTES.
In two cases arising separately in San Mateo and San Francisco
Counties, tenants Gray and Dionio were evicted from their apart-
ments by the county sheriffs pursuant to writs of possession follow-
ing actions brought by their landlords under the California unlaw-
ful detainer statutes.1 As provided by section 1174 of the Code of
Civil Procedure,2 all of the tenants' furnishings and personal prop-
1. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 1161-79a (West 1955).
2. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1174 (West Supp. 1971). § 1174 provides, in
pertinent part:
A plaintiff having obtained a writ of restitution of the premises
pursuant to an action for unlawful detainer, shall be entitled to
have the premises restored to him by officers charged with the
enforcement of such writs.... If the tenant does not vacate the
premises within five days from the date of service [of the writ],
or, if the copy of the writ is posted, within five days from the date
of mailing of the additional notice, the enforcing officer shall re-
move the tenant from the premises and place the plaintiff in pos-
session thereof...
All goods, chattels or personal property of the tenant remaining
on the premises at the time of its restitution to the plaintiff shall
be stored by the plaintiff in a place of safekeeping for a period of
30 days and may be redeemed by the tenant upon payment of
reasonable costs incurred by the plaintiff in providing such stor-
age and the judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, including costs.
Plaintiff may, if he so elects, store such goods, chattels or personal
property of the tenant on the premises, and the costs of storage in
such case shall be the fair rental value of the premises for the
term of storage. An inventory shall be made of all goods, chattels
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erty remaining in the apartments were seized by the sheriffs and
turned over to the respective landlords for storage. The tenants, in
an effort to regain certain of their personal possessions, attempted
to file statutory claims of exemption,3 which in each case the sheriffs
refused to honor.
Through class actions sounding in mandamus, injunction, and de-
claratory relief, the tenants sought to compel recognition of their
exemption claims and to prevent the retention and sale of their
property. The trial courts denied the petitions in both cases and the
tenants appealed.
Appeals in the two cases were consolidated for hearing with a
third case, arising in San Francisco, involving essentially similar
or personal property left on the premises prior to its removal and
storage or storage on the premises. Such inventory shall either be
made by the enforcing officer or shall be verified in writing by
him. The enforcing officer shall be entitled to his costs in pre-
paring or verifying such inventory.
In the event the property so held is not removed within 30 days,
such property shall be deemed abandoned and may be sold at a
public sale by competitive bidding, to be held at the place where
the property is stored, after notice of the time and place of such
sale has been given at least five days before the date of such sale
by publication once in a newspaper of general circulation published
in the county in which the sale is to be held. Notice of the public
sale may not be given more than five days prior to the expiration
of the 30 days during which the property is to be held in storage.
All money realized from the sale of such personal property shall
be used to pay the costs of the plaintiff in storing and selling
such property, and any balance thereof shall be applied in pay-
ment of the plaintiff's judgment, including costs. Any remaining
balance shall be returned to the defendant.
3. Cal. Stats., 1949, ch. 369, § 1 at 645 as amended CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE
§ 690 (West Supp. 1971); Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 1420, § 2 at 2810 (formerly
CAL. Cxv. PRO. CODE § 690.26), as amended CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 690.50
(West Supp. 1971).
§ 690 provided, in pertinent part:
The property mentioned in sections 690.1 to 690.25, inclusive,
... is exempt from execution or attachment, . . . when claim for
exemption is made to the same by the judgment debtor or defend-
ant as hereinafter in section 690.26 provided.
Various furnishings and personal effects were listed among the items in
sections 690.1 to 690.25.
§ 690.26 provided in pertinent part:
(1) If the property mentioned in sections 690.1 to 690.25, in-
clusive, shall be levied upon under writ of attachment or execu-
tion, the defendant or judgment debtor . .. , in order to avail
himself of his exemption rights as to such property, shall deliver to
the levying officer an affidavit ... alleging that the property
levied upon... is exempt ....
facts. In that case, evicted tenant Bryson petitioned for mandamus
in the court of appeal to compel the sheriff to recognize her exemp-
tion claims, and for an injunction against her landlord, the real
party in interest, to prevent him from retaining and selling her
property. The Court of Appeal, First District, held, affirmed in the
first two cases. The court, noting that the respective landlords were
not parties to the two actions and that issues were tendered in each
case only as between the tenants and the defendant sheriffs, held
that the tenants were not entitled to file claims of exemption. In
the third action, which originated in the court of appeal, the court,
noting that issues were presented both as against the sheriff and the
landlord, held that tenant Bryson was not entitled to relief against
the sheriff compelling recognition of her exemption claims. The
tenant was, however, entitled to limited relief prohibiting the land-
lord from requiring payment of his money judgment before redemp-
tion of the tenant's property as well as from applying proceeds of
sale of the property to the satisfaction of the money judgment.
The decision in Gray v. Whitmore4 comes to grips with the seem-
ingly impossible task of satisfying the competing interests in the re-
curring conflict between landlords and tenants. On the one hand,
a landlord should not be expected to provide free accommodations
for the person or property of a tenant who does not pay rent. On
the other hand, a tenant has a right not to be deprived of any of his
property except under a procedure which protects all his constitu-
tional rights. But if the tenant, when evicted from his apartment,
has not removed all of his personal property, what should be done
with it? The California Legislature has attempted to deal with this
problem in recent years5 by enacting amendments to section 1174.
Traditionally, statutory measures have tended to be more protective
of the rights of landlords than of tenants. 6 The purpose of this dis-
cussion will be to evaluate the adequacy of protection of the rights
of the tenant, especially in terms of the constitutional requirements
of due process and equal protection of the laws, as provided by the
amended statute and the court's decision.7
4. 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904, affg on rehearing, 14 Cal. App.
3d 784, 92 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1971), hearing denied, (June 17, 1971) [herein-
after cited as Gray].
5. See text accompanying notes 16-22, infrTa.
6. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037 (1967), denying cert. to 222
Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1966) (dissent by Douglas, J.).
7. That part of the Gray decision which strikes down the provision
allowing application of the stored goods of the tenant to satisfaction of
the money judgment will not be dealt with here. This discussion will be
limited to consideration of that aspect of section 1174 which provides for
storage of the tenant's unremoved goods by the landlord.
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The principal issue in Gray arose out of that part of section 1174
which directs the enforcing officer to inventory all of the evicted
tenant's personal property remaining on the premises and to turn it
over to the landlord to be stored for safekeeping for thirty days.
No provision is made in the statute for any goods to be exempt from
such seizure and storage. In Gray, when the tenants sought to re-
cover some of their personal necessities which were left in their
apartments at the time of eviction, they could only try to file claims
under the statutes allowing exemption of certain goods from levy
or execution.8
Few prior cases have dealt with this provision of the statute al-
lowing the landlord to retain and store property left on the prem-
ises, perhaps in part because by its nature the action involves im-
pecunious tenants who cannot afford the expense of an appeal. The
few cases prior to Gray which had considered this aspect of section
1174 were limited to lower courts and were not required to be given
weight in reaching the Gray decision, the first by a court of appeal
on the question.
In Love v. Keays,9 the Los Angeles County Superior Court de-
clared section 1174 to be unconstitutional, holding that by denying
to one class of judgment debtors the claims of exemption available
to all other judgment debtors, it violated equal protection require-
ments. On appeal, however, it was held that the statute was con-
stitutional, but that it required recognition of tenants' claims under
the exemption statutes.10 This appellate court opinion, though, was
not rendered until after Gray had been decided.
In Nelson v. Madigan," the Alameda County Superior Court
granted an injunction prohibiting the sheriff from giving custody
of the tenant's belongings to the landlord. Since the order was is-
sued without opinion the court's reasoning cannot be known. How-
ever it is reasonable to infer that the court in granting the tenant's
8. Cal. Stats., 1949, ch. 369, § 1 at 645, as amended CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 690.
9. [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 11, 464 (Civ. No.
957068, Los Angeles County Super. Ct., May 5, 1970).
10. Love v. Keays, 18 Cal. App. 3d 667, 96 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1971). The
appellate decision is discussed infra. See text accompanying notes 16-19.
11. [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. I[ 10,237 (Civ. No.
389916, Alameda County Super. Ct., June 20, 1969).
petition agreed with his contention that refusal to permit filing of
claims of exemption of which other categories of debtors could avail
themselves constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.
In both of these cases, Love v. Keays and Nelson v. Madigan, the
tenants contended that section 1174 must be held constitutionally
infirm if it were not to be read as limited by the exemption statutes.
The argument can be made, then, that inasmuch as the trial courts
held the questioned provisions unconstitutional,12 they reasoned
that the protection of the exemption statutes could not be read into
section 1174 by implication and that the section discriminated un-
fairly without such protection.
In Dobner v. Borrini,13 the only prior appellate-level case, the Ap-
pellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court held
that as to satisfaction of the money judgment only non-exempt
property could be applied. This indicates that the exemption stat-
utes were entitled to at least some recognition under the unlawful
detainer statute-presumably again on equal protection grounds,
although not so stated in the opinion. The court upheld, however,
the provision allowing storage and charges therefor without appli-
cation of the exemption statutes. The storage provision, it rea-
soned, is justified by the same tenant benefit and public interest
that supports the granting of exemptions in the first place.14 It may
be reasonably inferred that that interest is in the ability of the ten-
ant to maintain himself and his family, by preventing the loss of all
his property either through seizure in execution or through the de-
terioration that might result from its being left upon the street or
sidewalk.
But as was the case in Gray, the California procedure separates
the tenant immediately from all his belongings when he is removed,
and places them in the hands of the landlord. If he is thereby also
forced to leave behind clothing, personal papers and essentials, and
tools for earning a living, the knowledge that his property is being
protected is probably of little comfort.
In Gray, taking an approach similar to that in the cases mentioned
above, the tenants advanced three arguments in attacking the pro-
cedure: first, that section 1174 must be read to include allowance
12. Love v. Keays, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
11,464 (Civ. No. 957068, Los Angeles County Super. Ct., May 5, 1970);
Nelson v. Madigan, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
10,237 (Civ. No. 389916, Alameda County Super. Ct., June 20, 1969).
13. 4 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 84 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1970).
14. Id. at 3, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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of claims of exemption; second, that if the statute does not per-
mit such exemptions, it violates the requirements of due process in
that tenants are deprived of their property before they are afforded
an opportunity to defend against the landlord's claims to it; and
third, that without such exemptions the statute operates to deny
them the equal protection of the laws by creating unreasonable clas-
sifications between those tenant judgment debtors financially un-
able to remove their belongings before eviction and all other cate-
gories of judgment debtors.
In rejecting the first argument, the court found that the exemp-
tion statutes by their terms apply only to property which has been
levied upon under a writ of attachment or execution. It reasoned
that under the unlawful detainer procedure no levy or execution
took place. Rather, there was merely a delivery of the personal
property from the tenant to the landlord by operation of law when
the tenant permitted it to remain in the apartment at the time of
eviction. The court concluded that the sheriff's only involvement
with the goods was that of conducting an inventory. Absent the
levy or execution specified by the exemption statutes then, those
statutes could not apply, and the sheriff was not required to recog-
nize any claims of exemption pursuant to them.15
Shortly after the Gray decision the Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, in Love v. Keays,1 6 considered the question of whether evicted
tenant debtors are entitled to assert claims of exemption under sec-
tion 690 et seq., and reached the opposite conclusion to that in Gray.
The court held that the enforcing officers were bound to accept
claims of exemption from evicted tenant debtors. The court rea-
soned that section 1174, in requiring the officer to deliver inventor-
ied, unremoved personal property of the evicted tenant to the land-
lord, implicitly required a levy. The officer could not inventory or
deliver possession of the goods unless he himself had taken posses-
sion of them. The court took the view that under such a circum-
stance the officer's action necessarily constituted a levy and execu-
tion, and that section 1174 must be read in conjunction with the ex-
emption statutes.'1
15. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 18-19, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14.
16. 18 Cal. App. 3d 667, 96 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Love].
17. Id. at 672-74, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 509-11.
Under this decision, it would appear that the landlord could be re-
quired to store the exempt property for as much as thirty days and
then to release it free of charge when the tenant retrieves it under
his exemption claim.' s This would deprive the landlord of his prop-
erty. But the court concluded that neither such economic impact
nor public policy provides any justification for construing section
1174 so as to eliminate evicted tenants' rights to claim exemptions.19
As observed by the Gray court,20 the problem of what disposition
should be made of such property left by the evicted tenant has been
a troublesome one, which the legislature has made more than one
attempt to solve. The latest such attempt was a 1968 amendment to
section 117421 which wrought the provision for storage and charges
under discussion here. Prior to 1967 the enforcing officer was re-
quired to remove not only the defaulting tenant from his premises
but his personal property as well. 22 The officer then ". . . simply
put the property out on the street or sidewalk.123 Although that re-
sult could pose problems regarding obstruction of streets or side-
walks, or deterioration of the property,2 4 nonetheless the tenant's
belongings remained accessible so that he at least could obtain es-
sential items.
Pursuant to the 1967 amendment 2 the county was required to
store the property, and the enforcing officer then accepted claims
for exemption by the evicted tenant debtor.26 The 1968 amendment
with which Gray and Love were concerned shifted the responsi-
bility for storage from the county to the landlord, and provided that
the landlord would be entitled to reasonable charges therefor.
While the Gray court sought to give effect to the express terms
of the amended statute,27 in practical effect the decision leaves un-
lawful detainer as the only landlord-creditor remedy under which
18. Id. at 674, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12.
19. Id. at 675, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
20. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 14-15, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11.
21. Cal. Stats., 1968, ch. 102, § 2 at 315, as amended CAL. CIV. PRo. CoDE
§ 1174 (West Supp. 1971). Subsequent minor amendments made in 1969
and 1970 made no substantial changes and need not be considered here.
22. See Conniff v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 169, 175, 265 P. 555, 557
(1928).
23. Dobner v. Borrini, 4 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 3, 84 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1970).
This practice is still followed in other areas, including New York City.
See 667 East 187th Street Corp. v. Lindsay, 54 Misc. 2d 632, 283 N.Y.S.2d
199 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
24. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 14, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
25. Cal. Stats., 1967, ch. 1600, § 2 at 3830, as amended CAL. CIV. PRo.
CODE § 1174 (West Supp. 1971).
26. Love v. Keays, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 671, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
27. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 15-16, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
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the tenant may not assert claims of exemption. Compare the result
if the landlord were to choose instead the remedy provided under
the innkeeper's lien, or "baggage lien" statute28 for non-payment of
rent.
That statute creates a lien on the personal property of a tenant,
guest, or boarder for the proprietor's reasonable charges for ac-
commodations, rent, food, and other services. The landlord does not
evict the tenant under this procedure, but merely seeks to apply the
tenant's goods in satisfaction of his charges. He may take pos-
session only after obtaining a judgment in a normal civil action, or
on court order upon showing it necessary to prevent the tenant
from destroying or absconding with the goods.29 The proprietor
who does take and hold the property in storage by virtue of such
lien, however, has no lien for storage charges and is not entitled to
compensation for such storage.
30
If his judgment is not paid in thirty days he may sell the goods at
a public auction to satisfy the judgment. The statute includes, how-
ever, exemptions as to certain personal property to which the lien
may not attach 3 1-generally basic necessities similar to and in ad-
dition to all those items exempted from levy or execution under
section 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
From the landlord's point of view, of course, the unlawful de-
tainer procedure is preferable because by a swift summary proceed-
ing he at once regains possession of the premises for reletting and
gets a judgment for the unpaid rent. Further, he is freed of a non-
paying tenant and his property, or if it is not removed, gets posses-
sion of all the tenant's property without exemption. Although un-
der the Gray decision the landlord merely stores the goods for safe-
keeping, as a practical matter, having the goods thus secured he
may then proceed by writ of execution.
The decision in Love, on the other hand, preserves for the tenant
debtor the same exemption protection he enjoys under all other
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1861a (West Supp. 1971).
29. Id.
30. Id. §§ 1892, 2892. See also Pemberton v. Davis, 403 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir. 1968); In re Midwest Livestock Comm'n Co., 292 F. Supp. 955 (D. Nev.
1967); Owens v. Pyeatt, 248 Cal. App. 2d 840, 57 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1967).
31. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1861a (West Supp. 1971).
creditor remedies, and affords him an opportunity to regain the
essentials of family support and livelihood when his property is
stored by the landlord.
While the court in Love limited its consideration to the narrow
question of whether there was a levy by the enforcing officers
which required recognition of claims of exemption, 82 the Gray court
proceeded to examine further constitutional issues.
In rejecting the second argument set forth by the tenants in Gray,
regarding denial of due process, the court found that with regard to
the storage provision, the unlawful detainer procedure is a fair one,
affording adequate notice and hearing, as well as notice of removal
upon failure to vacate. It concluded that the purpose of restoration
of the premises to the landlord, free of the tenant and his property,
while at once providing protection for that property, was reasonably
attained by the statute. 3
Whether a procedure affords due process must be determined in
the light of its purpose and its effect upon the rights of those subject
to it, as well as other circumstances which may render that particu-
lar proceeding appropriate to the nature of the case.8 4 But unless
there is a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
due process requires at least that an individual be given adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to being sub-
jected by legal process to a significant deprivation.85
While it is true that the tenant is afforded notice of the proceed-
ings, the hearing in an unlawful detainer action is limited solely to
the question of right of possession of the premises, with no counter-
claims, cross-complaints, or affirmative defenses by the tenant per-
mitted. 6 The primary purpose of the action is to obtain possession
of the premises. 37 Any other relief included, such as an award of
damages for rent found due, or possession and storage of the tenant's
32. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
33. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 22-25, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 916-17.
34. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
35. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). See also Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Randone v.
Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550-51, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 718, 488 P.2d 13, 22
(1971).
36. Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 486, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17,
22 (1970). An exception to this rule exists for equitable defenses, such as
a claim that an eviction is racially motivated. See Abstract Investment
Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 247, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 313 (1962).
A claim of retaliatory eviction would also appear to be a permissible de-
fense. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1971).
37. Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756,
760 (1970).
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unremoved goods, is a mere incident to the main object-the recov-
ery of possession."8
But whether by a mere incident or not, as a consequence of the
action, the tenant is deprived of all personal property he is unable
to remove in time without a hearing as to right to possession of that
property.
Aside from the presumption of abandonment of the goods created
by the statute, the Gray court was able to find justification for such
a result by reasoning that the landlord is made a depositary of the
goods for the tenant's benefit, essentially no different than in the
case of voluntary storage by the tenant of furniture and belongings
in a warehouse. By viewing the deposit as a voluntary one by the
tenant, the court was then able to find it reasonable that the land-
lord should be compensated for storage, and should have a lien for
such charges much as that held by a warehouseman. 89
The court's reasoning of voluntariness may apply to most of the
tenants' property in the sense that its removal was prevented only
by the tenants' own circumstance in being unable to move else-
where. But logic does not compel the conclusion that the tenants
voluntarily left behind every necessity which the sheriff prevented
them from taking.40 To the contrary, the tenants' attempts to claim
exemption of such goods when evicted would seem to indicate that
in fact they did not choose voluntarily to leave those items behind.
If wages, as the United States Supreme Court has stressed, are a
unique type of property, deprivation of which can cause great
hardship in our present economic system,41 items of personal cloth-
ing, essential papers and implements of a tenant's trade would also
38. See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915).
39. Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d at 23-24, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 916-17.
40. San Diego Legal Aid Society attorneys customarily advise tenant
clients to remove at least any essential or valuable property before the
sheriff arrives the second time, after having previously served the tenant
with a five day notice to vacate. Once the sheriff comes to remove the
tenant, it is simply too late. The sheriff is not required to allow the
tenant to take anything with him whatever-not even a suitcase. Inter-
view with Charles A. Lynch, Supervising Attorney, Legal Aid Society of
San Diego, Inc., in San Diego, June 27, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Lynch
Interview].
41. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
seem to fall in that category.42 The deprivation of essential prop-
erty, "like the garnishment of wages, in many cases imposes tre-
mendous hardship on the defendant and his family and gives the
plaintiff unwarranted leverage.
'4 3
Justice Harlan, concurring in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
44
pointed out that the concept of "deprivation of property" includes
deprivation of the use of such property during the period preceding
an adjudication on the merits, and that
... due process is afforded only by the kinds of "notice" and
"hearing" which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least
the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged
debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted
use.4
5
The argument can be made, then, that if the tenant is forced to
leave in the hands of the landlord such minimum essentials of live-
lihood and family support, without being able to claim exemptions
and without being afforded a hearing on his right to retain such
goods, the procedure constitutes a denial of due process.
The private interest of the landlord-creditor would not appear to
provide sufficient justification for such a deprivation of basic es-
sentials. The California Supreme Court, in a recent decision 40 strik-
ing down a prejudgment attachment statute,47 declared that no
creditor interest is ever sufficient to justify the severe hardship
imposed on a debtor by deprivation of his "necessities of life" before
notice and a hearing on the validity of the creditor's claim. The
court further stated that the overbreadth of the attachment statute
in allowing seizure of necessities and non-necessities alike consti-
tuted an additional constitutional deficiency.48
But a fuller hearing encompassing additional issues such as the
right of the landlord to the personal property would vitiate the
summary nature of the proceeding and interfere with the primary
purpose of immediate restoration of the premises.4 9 Further, it
would place an even greater burden on the already overloaded court
system.
42. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 280-81, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 58,
486 P.2d 1242, 1258 (1971).
43. Id. at 279, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57, 486 P.2d at 1257.
44. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
45. Id. at 343 (concurring opinion).
46. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d
13 (1971).
47. CAL. Civ. PRo. CoDE § 537(1) (West Supp. 1971).
48. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723, 488
P.2d at 27.
49. See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 146, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915).
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The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly,50 while dealing with
public assistance payments, an entirely governmental activity, rea-
soned that
*. . what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the pre-
cise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.51
Moreover, the Court stressed the importance of not imposing upon
the states any procedural requirements beyond those demanded by
"rudimentary due process."' 52
In ascertaining what specific due process standards to use, one
may conclude that the state interest in holding strictly to the pri-
mary purpose and summary nature of the proceeding militates
against a more wide-ranging hearing. But if that interest is of such
overriding significance, then some other means must be provided
by which deprivation of the tenant's most basic necessities without
due process may be prevented-such as allowance of exemptions as
to those items.
The Gray tenants' third argument attacked the procedure on the
basis of a denial of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
means that "no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circumstances." 53 It does
not require absolute equality,54 nor is it ". . . a demand that a stat-
ute necessarily apply equally to all persons .... [L] egislation may
impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve per-
missible ends." 55 In most situations, equal protection requires only
that the legislation bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.6
But where a classification is based upon a "suspect" trait or where
fundamental interests are affected, the legislation is subjected to a
50. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. Id. at 263 [quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)].
52. 397 U.S. at 267.
53. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
54. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
55. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
56. McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
stricter standard of review.57 In these cases, it must be established
that the classification is "necessary to promote a compeling govern-
mental interest" before equal protection requirements are satis-
fied.5 1
The Gray court found the requirement of equal protection of the
laws satisfied by the storage provision of the statute because it af-
fords like treatment to all tenants. The court took the view that
under section 1174 tenant debtors whose goods are stored because
they are unable to remove them are treated like anyone else who
voluntarily places his goods in storage and thereby incurs a liability
for storage charges. 59
But in fact, the court did indeed note that the statute provides
different treatment for two different classes. In striking down the
provision of the statute which authorizes satisfaction of the land-
lord's money judgment, the court recognized that the statute cre-
ates classifications of, on the one hand, tenant debtors whose prop-
erty has been stored by the landlord and, on the other hand, all
other debtors, including those tenant debtors whose property has
not been stored. The statute, in that it does not provide like treat-
ment to both classes with regard to the exemption statutes, was
found to create a "suspect classification." 60  Manifestly, the same
classification which was found to exist with regard to the satisfac-
tion-of-judgment provision is present in the storage provision.
Again, as with the due process argument, finding the tenants' de-
posit of their goods with the landlord a voluntary one seemed to be
the significant factor which enabled the court to uphold the classi-
fication with regard to the storage provision. Indeed, on its face
the statute seems to allow all tenants an equal opportunity to avoid
having their property stored by the landlord, simply by choosing to
remove it before eviction. But the writer feels that this may be
an illusory choice for an indigent tenant who is, by definition, with-
out funds. A tenant who has funds to find and move to other quar-
ters is able to retain all his goods. But a tenant with no money to
move to another apartment, or even to rent a truck to remove his
57. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942): Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REv. 341, 356 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1088 (1969).
58. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
59. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 25-26, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 916-17.
60. Id. at 28, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
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goods, is deprived of all his property, even that which the legisla-
ture has deemed so essential to survival as to be exempt from any
other creditor remedy. If the ability to protect such otherwise ex-
empt property from seizure and storage is thus denied to one class
of debtor solely because he cannot "pay his way," it can be argued
that the result is unequal treatment for two classes of debtors based
on wealth.
Whether the stricter standard of review need be applied depends
upon both the nature of the classification and the importance of
the affected interest. The equal protection decisions show a slid-
ing scale approach to such determination. The more suspect the
classification, or the more fundamental the interest affected, the
more likely that an invidious discrimination will be found. On the
other hand, the less suspect the classification or the less important
the interest, the less likely is a finding of invidious discrimination. 61
It remains, then, to determine the status of the wealth classifica-
tion and the importance of the interest in retention of those goods
for which exemption was sought.
In McDonald v. Board of Election,6 2 the Supreme Court noted
that lines drawn on the basis of wealth "would independently ren-
der a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more ex-
acting judicial scrutiny."63 But even if not on a level with such sus-
pect classifications as those based upon race,64 classifications based
on wealth or property are "traditionally disfavored."65
As the Gray court observed, "there is a strong public policy favor-
ing exemption statutes since they are designed to save debtors from
61. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Forward: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91,
95 (1966); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Re-
turn of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716,
739-40, 744 (1969); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv.
L. REv. 1065, 1120-21 (1969).
62. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
63. Id. at 807.
64. It has been predicted that "... distinctions based on wealth-at
least those that run against the poor-will no doubt be assimilated to the
race cases." Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Sub-
stantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 75. But see Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 785-87 (1969).
65. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
want by reason of misfortune or their improvidence.",", One is led
to the conclusion, then, that by providing special protection to items
included in the exemption statutes, the legislature has determined
that such items are essential to the debtor's survival-i.e., that his
interest in them is fundamental.
Whether or not the wealth classification is by itself sufficiently
suspect to evoke the stricter judicial scrutiny, it can be argued that
the tenant-debtors' interest in the otherwise exempt property is
so fundamental that, when combined with the wealth classification
on the sliding scale, it will require a showing that the denial of his
right to claim such protection is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. Indeed the Supreme Court has suggested, in Shapiro
v. Thompson,67 ". . . that the 'compelling interest' test is applicable
merely because the result of the classification may be to deny ...
'food, shelter, and other necessities of life.'.
The Gray court took the view that the necessity of a compelling
state interest consisted in the finding of a practical and efficacious
solution to the troublesome problem of disposition of a tenant's un-
removed goods.6 9 But such a solution could be achieved with less
drastic measures by allowing the tenant, when removed, to claim
and remove such essential items of support and livelihood as are
enumerated in the exemption statutes. Moreover, as Love points
out, the delivery of possession of the goods by the sheriff for stor-
age could not take place unless the sheriff had himself taken the
goods into possession. Thus the sheriff's action necessarily is
in the nature of a levy and execution,7 0 whether so denominated by
the statute or not. If it is indeed a levy and execution, then recogni-
tion of exemption claims is required. To deny to one class, evicted
tenant debtors, the same right to claim basic necessities which is
enjoyed by all other debtors in the case of a levy or execution is to
deny them the equal protection of the laws. No state interest ap-
pears to the writer so compelling as to justify such a Draconian re-
sult.
Of course, the landlord's rights must be protected as well as the
tenant's. The burden of providing free housing for poor or low in-
come persons should not be thrust upon the individual landlord
who is merely by circumstance in the position of having the particu-
lar tenant living in his apartment when the money runs out. The
66. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 26-27, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
67. 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
68. Id. at 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. 17 Cal. App. 3d at 26, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 918-19.
70. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 672-73, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 509-11.
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landlord is entitled to be free of a non-paying tenant and his be-
longings. He should not have to provide rent-free storage for prop-
erty the tenant chooses to leave behind, whether exempt or not.
As a lower court earlier stated,
[T] o allow the tenant to require the landlord to protect his prop-
erty for 30 days and then come along and say, "Thank you very
much but that property is exempt so ru take it now and you may
stand the storage bill," would work an unreasonable hardship which
the Legislature could hardly have intended. Nor would this hard-
ship be materially lessened by giving the plaintiff, who already
has one uncollected judgment for rent, the right to recover another
for storage.71
But there is a countervailing public and tenant interest in the
tenant's survivability. The protection afforded those items in-
cluded in the exemption statutes is "not for the personal privilege
of the debtor but for the benefit of his family who may be destitute
and the public who might otherwise be burdened with the support
of an insolvent debtor's family."72 The denial of such exemption
protection for basic living essentials as a result of the Gray decision,
however, portends just such a result.
If the object of the unlawful detainer procedure is the restoration
to the landlord of his premises free of the tenant and his property,
the practical enforcement of that procedure hardly seems to ad-
vance that purpose when a tenant being removed by the sheriff is
forced to leave on the premises otherwise exempt property of which
the landlord supposedly wants to be free. Allowing the tenant to
remove even a small number of personal items would do more to
lessen the burdens of all concerned.
The sheriff, of course, having already given five days notice,
should not be expected to then wait outside while the tenant con-
ducts a large scale moving operation, but he might very well be ex-
pected to allow the tenant to gather a certain minimum of specifi-
cally exempted essential articles.
Appellate courts in both Gray v. Whitmore73 and Love v. Keays74
have struggled with the problem of divining the legislative intent
71. Dobner v. Borrini, 4 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4, 84 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111
(1970).
72. In re Perry, 225 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
73. 17 Cal. App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971).
74. 18 Cal. App. 3d 667, 96 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1971).
behind the storage provision of section 1174. Inasmuch as the two
courts have reached squarely opposite conclusions on the question
of whether the procedure requires recognition of exemption claims,
the resolution of the divergent views lies with the California Su-
preme Courtr 5
But neither of the two opposing views, Gray or Love, adequately
provides for protection of the rights of both the landlord and the
tenant. Under the Gray decision, despite its salutary rejection of
the requirement for satisfaction of the money judgment before the
tenant may claim his goods, the operation of the procedure without
exemptions permits the tenant to be deprived of even the minimum
means of survival.76 Not letting the tenant take such essentials as
clothing, medicine and items used in earning a living only furthers
the interest of the landlord in satisfying his money judgment, a
purpose declared by the Gray court not to be within the compass of
the statute. Separating the tenant from those items serves only
to increase the landlord's leverage.
Under Love, on the other hand, the landlord might be required
to store the exempt property for a week or two before the tenant re-
trieves it free of charge under his exemption claim. This would in-
fringe upon the property rights of the landlord.
CONCLUSION
It is the writer's view that the legislature, not the courts, should
determine in what manner the procedure will operate. The courts
must, of course, interpret the statute. But they must interpret it as
it is written. They cannot rewrite the statute to conform to what
they presume to have been the legislative intent. That is for the
legislature.
77
An amendment to section 1174 is needed which will remedy the
constitutionally impermissible result of placing the indigent tenant
debtor in a different position from other debtors with regard to
deprivation of living essentials. At the same time, the amendment
should provide against undue infringement of the landlord's prop-
erty interest. Such a provision might specify certain exempt prop-
erty such as personal clothing, food, medicines, bedding, and imple-
ments and papers of the tenant's trade, which he could claim from
75. The state supreme court denied a hearing to Gray v. Whitmore on
June 17, 1971. Love v. Keays, however, was granted a hearing Sept. 8, 1971.
76. See Lynch Interview, supra note 40.
77. Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 369, 5 P.2d 882,
885 (1931).
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among his belongings on the premises at the time of eviction. Other
remaining property would be subject to storage for safekeeping as
presently provided.
The storage provision of section 1174 may be a reasonable attempt
at a solution to the problem of disposition of goods an evicted tenant
chooses to leave behind. But the legislature should act to clarify
the intended enforcement of the procedure and to protect the funda-
mental rights of both landlord and tenant.
ROBERT L. O'CONNELL
